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1. Introduction      
The 2005 hurricane season in the United States was one of the most active seasons 
documented. Hurricane Dennis, the first major hurricane of the season, weakened to 
Category 3 strength before making landfall over the western Florida Panhandle on July 10, 
2005. Hurricane Dennis caused considerable damage across the western Florida Panhandle, 
including widespread utility and communications outages and storm surge-related damage 
far to the east of the landfall location (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 
2005a). 
Hurricane Katrina entered southern Florida on August 25, 2005 as a Category 1 hurricane 
before rapidly gaining strength in the Gulf of Mexico. The storm made its second landfall in 
south eastern Louisiana on August 29, 2005, as a Category 3 hurricane (Knabb et al., 2005a). 
Due to levy failures in the New Orleans area, Hurricane Katrina was one of the worst 
natural disasters to ever strike the United States. Katrina resulted in an estimated 1,464 
deaths in Louisiana, numerous illnesses and injuries, and substantial infrastructure damage 
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2005e; Knabb et al., 2005a; Louisiana 
Department of Health and Hospitals 2006).  
Hurricane Rita was also classified as a Category 3 hurricane when it struck the Louisiana-
Texas border on September 24, 2005 (Knabb et al., 2005b).  Although the impact from 
Hurricane Rita was not as severe as that from Hurricane Katrina, the approach of Hurricane 
Rita generated one of the largest evacuations in United States history; estimates exceed 2 
million evacuees in Texas (Knabb et al., 2005b).  
Hurricane Wilma, another Category 3 hurricane, struck the southwest coast of Florida on 
October 24, 2005 (Taylor et al., 2007). Hurricane Wilma caused extensive damage to homes 
and power lines and also temporarily displaced thousands of residents (Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, 2006b).   
Much of the public health response to the hurricanes was focused on assessing health-
related needs and surveillance of injuries, infectious diseases, and other illnesses (Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention, 2005b; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
2005c; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2005e; Knabb et al., 2005a; Knabb et al., 
2005b; Tayor et al., 2007; Todd, 2006).  However, the hurricanes also resulted in unintended 
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chemical releases in the affected states.  When natural disasters, such as hurricanes, trigger 
technological disasters, the resulting event is called a natural-technologic or “natech” event.  
Natech events may involve releases of household chemicals or large industrial releases, such 
as an oil leak from a severed pipeline (Young et al., 2004). Industrial natech releases can 
involve the release of extremely toxic substances and have the potential to expose large 
numbers of people.  Hurricane Katrina resulted in small- and large-scale natech events.  
There were unintentional chemical releases with widespread health implications for affected 
populations (Picou, 2009).  
This chapter summarizes chemical incident surveillance data associated with the 2005 
hurricanes from three states participating in the Hazardous Substances Emergency Events 
Surveillance (HSEES) system at the time (Florida, Louisiana, and Texas). Additionally, case 
studies and lessons learned from hurricanes developed as part of a chemical emergencies 
workgroup are presented to give more detailed insight into the types and causes of the 
hurricane natech releases, and their environmental public health impact.  
2. Methods 
2.1 HSEES data analysis  
HSEES was an active multi-state web-based surveillance system maintained by the United 
States Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) from 1990-2009.  HSEES 
collected information on uncontrolled or unpermitted acute releases of hazardous 
substances meeting specific pre-established criteria. The surveillance system enabled 
identification of factors related to the public health impact of these acute events and 
activities to lessen the impact of and potential for future events.  Events involving petroleum 
only were excluded because of the Petroleum Exclusion clause of the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act which prohibits ATSDR from 
becoming involved with incidents where any form of petroleum was released that had not 
been refined to the point of becoming a specific chemical product, such as pure xylene 
(CERCLA/SARA). HSEES collected data on all other hazardous substance incidents, 
including ones with petroleum where another hazardous substance is present (ATSDR, 
2005a).  HSEES was a surveillance system for a wide range of hazardous materials incidents 
and therefore is not specifically designed to collect data on hurricane chemical emergencies. 
State health department personnel used a variety of sources (e.g., records and oral reports of 
state environmental agencies, police and fire departments, and hospitals) to collect 
information about the acute hazardous substances events. Information collected for each 
event included the location and industry involved in the event, hazardous substances 
released, number of victims, evacuations, and contributing causal factors for the event.  The 
HSEES system collected data on the primary contributing factor and the secondary 
contributing factors related to an event.  Information on contributing causal factors was 
either reported by the notification source or determined by the state HSEES coordinator 
using various reports.  Data were entered into a Web-based application that enabled ATSDR 
to access the data. 
A victim was defined as a person experiencing at least one documented adverse health 
effect (such as respiratory irritation or chemical burns) that was likely associated with the 
event and occurred within 24 hours after the release (ATSDR, 2005a). Hazardous substances 
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released were grouped into 13 categories: acids, ammonia, bases, chlorine, hetero-organics, 
hydrocarbons, mixture across categories, carbon monoxide, pesticides, polymers, volatile 
organic compounds, other inorganic substances, and other substances.  Mixtures across 
categories consisted of hazardous substances that were mixed before release, including 
hazardous substances from more than one of the other 12 categories used.  The category 
“other inorganic substances” comprised all inorganic substances—except for acids, bases, 
ammonia, and chlorine—and includes hazardous substances such as nitrogen oxide and 
hydrogen sulfide. The “other” category consisted of hazardous substances, such as asbestos, 
that could not be classified into any of the other 12 categories.    
For this analysis, data from the three participating states affected by the hurricanes (Florida, 
Louisiana, and Texas) were analyzed to describe the characteristics of hazardous substances 
releases associated with the 2005 hurricanes.  Events were identified as hurricane-related 
based on the date of the incident and state reports. Descriptive statistics are presented 
including contributing causal factors, hazardous substances and industries/locations 
involved in the releases, victim information, and event scenarios, with emphasis on those 
events with actual or potential public health impact.  
2.2 Case study derivation 
Case studies and lessons learned about chemical emergencies during hurricanes were 
derived from a review of the literature on three prominent hazardous materials incidents 
relating to the hurricanes. Only one of the three case studies was captured by HSEES; the 
other two did not qualify for HSEES because they were either petroleum–related or were a 
chronic release. The case study of the incident captured by HSEES is based on details from 
the literature as these were more extensive that the information captured by HSEES.  
The three case studies were originally prepared for the Agency for Toxic Substances and 
Disease Registry Chemical Emergencies workgroup of the National Conversation on Public 
Health and Environmental Exposures and have been modified for this chapter. These case 
studies are reviews and interpretations of the current literature concerning these incidents 
and are presented to give a broader perspective on hurricane-related hazardous substance 
issues than HSEES data alone can provide.  
3. Results 
3.1 Data from HSEES 
In 2005, 245 hurricane-related chemical events were reported to HSEES from the coastal 
states of Florida, Louisiana, and Texas. Figure 1 is a timeline of the four hurricanes with 
information on category, area where they made landfall, and number of HSEES events. Of 
the 245 events, 133 occurred in Texas, 68 occurred in Florida, and 44 occurred in Louisiana.  
These events represented 7% of all HSEES events combined in Florida, Louisiana, and Texas 
in 2005 (ATSDR, 2005a).  Fifty-four percent of the events were related to Hurricane Rita, 24% 
were related to Wilma, 19% were related to Katrina, and 3% were related to Dennis.   
The two most frequently reported industries/locations involved in hurricane-related events 
were manufacturing (159, 65%) and private households (48, 20%) (Table 1). Chemical 
manufacturing (n=115) and petroleum and coal manufacturing (n=42) accounted for 99% of 
the manufacturing events. 
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Wilma  
Category 3 
October 24 
Southwest coast  
Florida 
59 events 
Rita  
Category 3 
September 24 
Louisiana-
Texas border 
132 events 
Katrina  
Category 3 
August 29 
Southeast 
Louisiana 
47 events 
Dennis 
Category 3 
July 10 
Florida 
Panhandle 
7 events 
 
Fig. 1. Timeline of 2005 Atlantic Hurricane and HSEES incidents. 
 
Industry/location 
Number 
of events 
Percent 
All manufacturing    159 65 
Private households 48 20 
Mining 11 4 
Unknown 11 4 
Utilities  4 2 
Wholesale or retail trade 6 2 
Other 6 2 
Total 245 99 
Table 1. Industry/location of hurricane-related events, Hazardous Substances Emergency 
Events Surveillance (HSEES) System, 2005. 
3.2 HSEES events involving evacuation, response, and nearby areas 
Activities conducted to protect public health during hurricane-related events included 
health advisories (n=14) and environmental sampling (n=10). One building was evacuated 
because of a hurricane-related hazardous substances event; the evacuation lasted 2 hours.  
No response personnel were involved in 80 of the events; multiple types of responders 
responded to the remaining 165 events. 
Personnel most frequently responding to hurricane-related events included company 
response teams (n=128) and hospitals or poison control centers (n=22).  Other responders 
included fire departments (n=8), law enforcement officials (n=7), certified HazMat teams 
(n=5), third-party clean-up contractors (n=5), emergency medical services (n=4), 
environmental agencies (n=2), and departments of public works (n=1).   
Most events (n=220) were contained inside the facility or within 200 feet of the release.  The 
area impacted was missing for 19 events.  In six events, the chemical extended beyond the 
facility and affected greater than 200 feet beyond the release. All of these events were in 
Louisiana, in predominately industrial areas with little or no residences, schools, daycare 
facilities, nursing homes, hospitals, or recreational parks within ¼ mile of the release.  
Descriptions of these 6 incidents are as follows:  
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Event 1- Approximately 980 pounds of ammonia were released with 490 pounds of nitrogen 
oxides after a power failure caused by Hurricane Katrina at a nitrogen fertilizer 
manufacturer. The power failure resulted in a loss of refrigeration to the ammonia storage 
tanks. This caused an emergency release of ammonia to a flare. The ammonia was only 
partially combusted by the flare and thus formed the nitrogen oxides.  
Event 2- Seven hundred fifty nine pounds of zinc bromide were released from storage tanks 
that were washed away from an oil and gas support operation during Hurricane Katrina.   
Event 3- Ten pounds of nitrogen oxide and 500 pounds of sulfur dioxide were released 
when a petroleum refinery shut down its plant in preparation for Hurricane Katrina and 
there was a release to the stack.  
Event 4- A chemical product and preparation manufacturer released 270 pounds of 
ammonia and 75 pounds of nitrogen oxides when the ammonia storage tank routed to the 
flare after the compressors were shut down in preparation for Hurricane Katrina, thus 
causing a release of nitrogen oxides as a combustion product.  
Event 5- Seven hundred eighty pounds of ammonia were released from a nitrogen 
fertilizer manufacturer when a power outage caused the loss of key monitoring 
equipment. The flare on the ammonia tank was blown out by the high winds sustained 
during Hurricane Rita.   
Events 1-5 occurred in industrial areas with no nearby residences, nursing homes, schools, 
or daycare facilities.  
Event 6- One thousand eighty two pounds of chlorine were released from an alkali and 
chlorine manufacturing plant when a power failure due to Hurricane Rita caused excess 
pressure in the chlorine tank. The tank had to be manually vented to reduce pressure and 
protect the tank integrity. Approximately 493 persons lived within ¼ mile, and a licensed 
daycare center was within ¼ mile of the release; no information was available about 
whether people were in the homes or daycare center when the release occurred. 
3.3 HSEES causal factors 
Bad weather conditions (n=165, 67%) were the most frequent primary causal factor 
contributing to hurricane-related events. Other primary causal factors were human error 
(n=61, 25%), equipment failure (n=11, 4%), and intentional release (n=8, 3%). Of the 225 
(92%) events where a secondary causal factor was also reported, the most frequently 
reported were system start-up or shut down (n=120, 53%) and power failure (n=70, 31%).  
Other secondary causal factors included equipment failure (n=19, 8%), system/process 
upset (n=7, 3%), and fire (n=4, 2%). Of the 120 events where system start-up or shut down 
was a contributing causal factor, 6 (5%) were shutdowns in preparation for Hurricane 
Katrina, 59 (49%) were shutdowns in preparation for Hurricane Rita, and 55 (46%) were 
start-ups after Hurricane Rita. 
3.4 HSEES incidents hazardous substances involved 
A total of 283 hazardous substances were released in the 245 hurricane-related events.  The 
number of hazardous substances released per event ranged from 1 to 8. Most events were 
air releases (88%), 9% were spills, 1% were fires, 1% were threatened releases, and <1% 
involved an air release with a fire.   
The categories of hazardous substances most frequently released in these events were 
mixture across categories (34%), carbon monoxide (21%), volatile organic compounds (16%), 
and other inorganic substances (15%) (Table 2). The most frequently released individual 
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hazardous substances were carbon monoxide (n=59, 21%), oxides of nitrogen (includes 
nitrogen oxide and nitrogen dioxide) (n=16, 6%), a mixture of carbon monoxide/nitrogen 
dioxide/propylene (n=8, 3%), and ammonia (n=8, 3%).   
 
Substance Category Frequency Percent 
Mixture across categories 97 34 
Carbon monoxide 59 21 
Volatile organic compounds 45 16 
Other inorganic substances 42 15 
Other 10 4 
Ammonia 8 3 
Acids  7 2 
Hydrocarbons 4 1 
Pesticides 4 1 
Bases 2 1 
Chlorine 2 1 
Polymers 2 1 
Hetero-organics 1 <1 
Total 283  
Table 2. Substance categories released in hurricane-related events, Hazardous Substances 
Emergency Events Surveillance (HSEES) System, 2005. 
3.5 HSEES victims 
There were 160 victims in 62 hurricane-related events (25% of all hurricane-related events).  
Florida reported 116 of the victims, Louisiana reported 7, and Texas reported 37.  Ninety-
nine additional people in 49 events were observed at a medical facility but did not require 
treatment, so are not counted as victims.  
Although manufacturing events accounted for 65% of the hurricane-related events, less than 
1% of the events in this industry category resulted in victims. Most of the victims were 
injured in carbon monoxide events in private households (n=103, 64%). All 59 of the carbon 
monoxide events were in Florida and all had victims. A bus accident and fire involving 
nursing home residents and their oxygen tanks in Texas resulted in 36 (23%) victims. The 
industry/location was unknown for 18 (11%) victims, and there was 1 victim each in retail, 
manufacturing and the postal service. Most (n=139, 87%) victims were members of the 
general public, followed by employees (n=11, 7%). However there were also 10 (6%) 
responder victims as follows:  
1. Six career firefighters suffered carbon monoxide-related symptoms while helping with 
post-Katrina recovery efforts. Generator exhaust fumes from a nearby motor home 
entered the camper in which they were sleeping.   
2. One responder was injured when a barrel containing a mixture of hydrocarbon, hydrogen 
sulfide, and water leaked during post-Katrina orphan drum recovery operations. 
3. Three fire rescue responders were among six people injured by carbon monoxide 
exposure as a result of improper generator use in a power outage after hurricane 
Wilma.  One non-responder in this event died. 
www.intechopen.com
Case Studies and Lessons Learned in Chemical Emergencies Related to Hurricanes   
 
489 
The ratio of male to female victims was approximately 50/50. The victims ranged in age 
from less than 1 year old to 100 years old, but most victims were 20-44 years old (41%) 
(median age was 34 years).  The most frequent injuries/symptoms were dizziness/central 
nervous system effects (38%), headache (22%), gastrointestinal problems (15%), and thermal 
burns (11%) (Table 3).   
 
Injury/Illness Number of victims Percent 
Dizziness/central nervous system symptoms 81 38 
Headache 48 22 
Gastrointestinal problems 32 15 
Thermal burns 24 11 
Respiratory irritation 12 6 
Trauma 7 3 
Eye irritation 4 2 
Shortness of breath 4 2 
Heart Problems 3 1 
Total 215 100 
Table 3. Injuries/illnesses sustained in hurricane-related events, Hazardous Substances 
Emergency Events Surveillance (HSEES) System, 2005. 
Twenty-nine persons died on scene or after arrival at a hospital. Treatment information was 
available for 115 of the remaining 131 victims. These victims were treated at a hospital and 
released (n=62), admitted to a hospital (n=19), received first aid only (n=4), or were 
observed at the hospital (n=1). Only one victim was decontaminated.  
Two victims wore personal protective equipment. One wore Level C personal protective 
equipment which requires a full-face or half-mask, air-purifying respirator and chemical 
resistant hooded clothing, inner and outer gloves, and steel toe boots. The other wore Level 
D personal protective equipment which is the lowest level of protection and requires 
coveralls and safety shoes/boots. Personal protective equipment levels are determined by 
the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s Standard (29 Code of Federal 
Regulations 1910.120 (q)).  
3.6 HSEES events with fatalities 
Twenty-three nursing home residents died from thermal burns in a charter bus fire and medical 
oxygen tank explosion in Texas during an evacuation in anticipation of Hurricane Rita.  
There were six deaths among members of the general public in five events in Florida from 
carbon monoxide exposure. One event occured in July after Hurricane Dennis, one in 
August after Hurricane Katrina, and three in October after Hurricane Wilma. Five events 
were due to generator misuse and one event was due to charcoal grill misuse because of 
hurricane-related power loss.   
4. Case studies 
4.1 Case study background 
HSEES collected a broad array of incidents and was not specifically tailored to collect data 
on chemical emergencies during hurricanes or other natural disasters. Therefore, the case 
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study section reviews the literature on three incidents of chemical emergencies during 
hurricanes for issues that were broader than the typical HSEES data to elucidate lessons 
learned. These case studies were chosen to bring up issues that HSEES does not focus data 
collection on, including vulnerable populations, petroleum emergency clean-up, and 
chemical waste disposal issues. These were three very prominent cases that arose from the 
2005 hurricane season. 
4.2 Case study 1  
On September 23, 2005, at 3 p.m. a nursing home began evacuating prior to Hurricane Rita. 
A charter bus was secured when the regular bus was unavailable. The nursing home did not 
have time to carefully select a bus and had to take the first available bus. The bus was 
carrying 44 nursing home residents and nursing staff from Bellaire, Texas to Dallas, Texas.  
Although the bus had originally been going to a much closer shelter, the shelter was full and 
they had to go to a much farther one. Early the next morning, a motorist alerted the bus 
driver that the right-rear tire hub was glowing red. Upon stopping the bus, the driver and 
nursing staff observed flames emanating from the right-rear wheel well and they began to 
evacuate the bus.  
The bus was quickly engulfed in flames when the residents’ oxygen tanks exploded and 
further fueled the fire. Twenty-three passengers died, 2 passengers were seriously injured 
and 19 received minor injuries. The bus driver also received minor injuries (National 
Transportation Safety Board, 2007). This incident was also contained in the HSEES database.  
Contributing factors for this event were the charter bus company’s failure to conduct proper 
vehicle maintenance, failure to do pre-trip inspections, and previous violations of several 
United States safety regulations pertaining to its drivers and vehicles; the lack of fire 
retardant construction materials on the bus exterior and adjacent to the wheel well; and no 
guidance for emergency transportation of medical oxygen cylinders on a bus. Release valves 
on the cylinders were designed to release during a fire only if they were fully pressurized. 
Therefore, cylinders that were in use and partially pressurized exploded and became 
dangerous projectiles during the fire. Additionally, emergency responders had difficulty 
rescuing passengers because of window height and top-hinge design window exits that are 
not optimally designed for elderly or children; the latches are difficult to open and the drop 
to the ground was too far (National Transportation Safety Board, 2007).   
4.3 Case study 2  
Storm surge from Hurricane Katrina placed an oil tank facility and surrounding 
neighborhoods in St. Bernard Parish, Louisiana under water for several days. When the 
water receded, it was discovered that the hurricane had dislodged a 250,000 barrel above-
ground storage tank containing about 65,000 barrels of mixed crude oil (Agency for Toxic 
Substances and Disease Registry, 2005b). Approximately 25,110 barrels (slightly over a 
million gallons) of oil spilled from the ruptured tank.   
The initial response was delayed because of high water, debris, barricades by the National 
Guard or local police, downed telephone lines, and lack of satellite phones. When the area 
was accessible, the United States Environmental Protection Agency on-scene commander 
directed the facility to secure the tank, identify the extent of the release, and begin recovery 
operations. The facility immediately began pumping out the containment canals and 
recovered approximately 72% of the oil.  
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In October 2005, long-term remediation was initiated with oversight by the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency and the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality, 
including clean up on land, residential areas, and non-commercial waterways.  
Approximately 1,800 affected properties in an area of about one square mile were identified 
through a house-to-house visual survey conducted from the street. The Environmental 
Protection Agency classified contamination on 114 properties as heavy (more than 50% of 
the yard, sidewalks, and home were covered with oil), 286 properties as medium (about 50% 
of the yard and sidewalks were covered in oil), and the balance as light to oil line only 
(small percent of oil was visible on horizontal surfaces or a “bathtub ring” of visible product 
band approximately 3 to 6 inches wide was seen on the residence, with no visible oil on the 
yard, sidewalks, and home (Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, 2005c).  
However, some affected properties may have been missed because properties that were not 
visible from the street or public sidewalk were not surveyed due to legal access 
requirements.  The more heavily affected areas were immediately to the west of the facility. 
The 25 month long clean-up of the contaminated properties within the impacted area began 
with the facility removing oil-stained sediment and soil. After removal, the remaining soil 
was analyzed to ensure that the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality risk 
evaluation/corrective action program residential soil standards for High Public Use Areas 
were met.  If the standards were not met, additional soil was removed and the process was 
repeated.   
Residential clean-up was complex and involved two phases. In Phase 1, property owners 
requested clean-up from the facility and granted them access to the property, and the facility 
obtained wipe and sediment samples (10% of the samples were split with the Environmental 
Protection Agency) and washed home exteriors. In Phase 2, the homeowner was responsible 
for gutting the house to the studs, and the facility removed the oiled part of the debris and 
transported it to an industrial landfill. The homeowner then requested an interior cleaning 
from the facility and granted them a second access to the property which involved the 
facility power washing the home’s interior and exterior and replacing the yard.  
Reoccupation of the property was determined by the parish based on results of a final air 
sample (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Region 6, 2006).   
Several factors impeded residential clean-up, including class actions lawsuits filed against the 
facility that restricted homeowner contact with the facility and therefore barred remediation by 
the facility; temporary or permanent relocation of many residents after the spill; and lack of 
funds to complete the clean-up because the facility was only responsible for the oil-damaged 
part of the cleanup. This resulted in a less efficient clean-up and an “island effect” where oiled 
homes were next to cleaned homes because crews could not clean up whole contiguous blocks 
of neighborhoods (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Region 6, 2006). 
The Environmental Protection Agency shared the results of more than 800 sediment/soil 
samples collected from properties between September 19 and November 8, 2005 with the 
Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry and requested an assessment of potential 
health hazards posed by the contamination. In December 2005, the Agency for Toxic 
Substances and Disease Registry released a health consult for the site which concluded that 
for the properties sampled, there were no short or long term risks from oil-related chemicals 
in sediment and soil for most properties. Recommendations were made that properties 
should be evaluated and remediated if necessary for other potential health hazards, such as 
indoor mold and structural damage, prior to re-occupancy. The recommendation was also 
made that properties which exceeded recommended soil standards should be remediated to 
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be protective of public health for re-occupancy. Additionally, the health consult 
recommended that residents avoid bare skin contact with sediment, soil, and indoor 
surfaces with visible oil contamination and that homes with visible indoor oil contamination 
or noticeable petroleum odors be tested to determine if concentrations of chemicals in 
indoor air were of health concern prior to re-occupancy (Agency for Toxic Substances and 
Disease Registry, 2005b).    
Oil companies were not required to plan to withstand storm surges that resulted from 
Hurricane Katrina. However, in 2007, a buyout program to create a buffer around the 
facility was approved to minimize the threat of future spills. In August 2009, the Louisiana 
Department of Environmental Quality determined that the area’s shallow groundwater was 
unaffected by the spill and concluded that the area impacted by the spill had been 
remediated to acceptable levels.   
Recovery and response related to this spill were complicated by competing priorities (local, 
state, and federal) and high background levels of contamination in that area of Louisiana 
which interfered with the sampling. Communication issues were also a major barrier and 
included delays in the public receiving information about contaminant levels which was 
often on a website that was not accessible to the affected population; difficulties in 
interpreting data and comparing it with general drinking water or ambient air quality 
standards which were not appropriate for an acute exposure event; and adequately 
conveying re-occupancy policies because federal agencies had a different opinion than the 
parish who ultimately made the decision (Manuel, 2006; Johnson, et al. 2005). 
4.4 Case study 3  
As a result of Hurricane Katrina, the city of New Orleans needed to quickly find a disposal 
site for the approximately 55 million cubic yards of hurricane-related debris and waste 
contaminated with hazardous substances that were created.  In response, the Mayor of New 
Orleans issued an executive decree which reopened three closed landfills and granted a 
conditional permit to urgently convert the Chef Menteur site from a light industrial zone to 
a landfill.  The Chef Menteur landfill began accepting waste in April 2006 (Choi et al., 2006).  
The approximately 100 acre Chef Menteur site was created about 40 years ago by 
construction companies for use as a local source of sand for building. In July 1994, an 
application for a permit to begin construction of a landfill at this site was submitted to the 
Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality. Because of extensive resistance and 
pressure from the local community and the proximity of the site to the nation’s largest urban 
wildlife refuge, the city council denied the permit in March 1997 (Choi et al., 2006). 
The Chef Menteur Landfill is located in the Versailles neighborhood and is next to the 23,000 
acre Bayou Sauvage Wildlife Refuge. It is less than a mile from the center of a mostly 
Vietnamese- and African-American community of approximately 15,000 residents (Choi et 
al., 2006).  The unlined landfill has a large storage capacity and was approved to accept 6.5 
million cubic yards (about 2.6 million tons) of construction and demolition debris (Louisiana 
Department of Environmental Quality, 2006). Besides trees and sheetrock, the site also 
accepted asbestos-containing materials and the moldy contents of gutted homes, including 
household pesticides, electronics, personal-care products, cleaning solutions, paint, and 
bleach.   
Although the landfill lacked the liners required to stop leachate from leaking into the water 
table and contaminating surface water and groundwater, the state department of 
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environmental quality stated that the landfill had a 10 foot clay bed, which they maintained 
was enough to stop leachate from reaching the community and wildlife refuge. Opponents 
of the landfill argued that this was not the industry standard, nor the environmental 
standard, which calls for multiple layers of both composite and clay (Colby, 2008). Other 
environmental and public health concerns included that landfill leachate would affect the 
watering source for the community gardens and locally caught seafood, as well as exposure 
to air pollution from the over 1,000 trash carrying trucks per day that drove along the main 
road leading into the community (Colby, 2008; Citizens for a Strong New Orleans East, 
2006). 
The landfill was supposed to be capped with two feet of clay and six inches of topsoil. This 
type of cap may not be effective in preventing precipitation from entering the landfill, 
mixing with wastes, and forming leachate, especially in southern Louisiana, which receives 
approximately 60-80 inches of rain per year (Choi et al., 2006) Additionally, the landfill is 
surrounded by permeable soil, and much of the site is a wetlands area where the water table 
is at or near the surface of the ground. Soil borings showed that groundwater is located 
between 1.6 and approximately 12 feet below the surface (Choi et al., 2006).  
Several air and water samples taken by the state department of environmental quality in 
May and June 2006 shortly after the landfill opened showed that contaminants were below 
levels of concern (Choi et al., 2006). However, the community is concerned about potential 
long-term effects. Amid mounting pressure and lawsuits by the community and 
environmental groups, the Mayor of New Orleans did not renew the landfill’s permit, and 
the landfill was closed in August 2006.  
5. Discussion 
5.1 HSEES incident distribution 
HSEES recorded 245 hurricane-related events in 2005. All of the Hurricane Dennis and 
Hurricane Wilma events were reported by Florida because this was the only U.S. state 
affected by these hurricanes. Texas did not have any Hurricane Katrina-related events 
because of the path of the hurricane. Texas reported most of the Hurricane Rita-related 
events because Beaumont and Port Arthur, as well as several other areas in the state, shut 
down their plants in preparation for Hurricane Rita.  Louisiana reported fewer events from 
Hurricane Rita because of the path of the hurricane and many of their plants were still not 
operating when Hurricane Rita struck. Florida did not report any events associated with 
Hurricane Rita, likely because of the mandatory evacuation orders for the Florida keys and 
because the Florida Panhandle escaped most of the land effects from the hurricane (National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2005b).  
5.2 HSEES limitations 
The HSEES system had several limitations.  As in any disaster, local and state public health 
and emergency response infrastructure was severely disrupted by the hurricanes.  Because 
of this some events may not have been reported and some data may not have been captured 
during follow-up. In Louisiana, agencies were only notified about the most severe releases 
that resulted from Hurricane Katrina, so some events may not have been included in 
HSEES. Furthermore, HSEES collected information on acute, not chronic, releases, and 
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releases of only petroleum were excluded. Lastly, since HSEES is a surveillance system for a 
variety of hazardous material releases, it is not specifically tailored for hurricanes and 
therefore does not capture detailed information on these incidents. 
Carbon monoxide exposure was traditionally underreported in the HSEES system because 
of the lack of existing reporting mechanisms. A case review of medical charts and 
emergency medical services records coded as carbon monoxide poisoning found 41 non-
fatal cases from 11 incidents and 10 deaths from 4 incidents in Texas that were not reported 
to HSEES while analysis of hyperbaric oxygen facilities reports detected 16 non-fatal and 5 
fatal cases among Louisiana residents that were not reported to HSEES (Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, 2006b; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2005d). 
Additionally, after data closeout, Florida identified 31 cases of carbon monoxide exposure 
through hospitals and medical examiners reports.   
5.3 Manufacturing industry 
Most events involved the manufacturing industry (65%), however, only one injured person 
was associated with this industry. This is likely because there were few people in the area to 
be harmed, most facilities had already shut down and were operating with reduced crews 
and many residents evacuated the areas before the hurricanes hit (Knabb et al, 2005a; Knabb 
et al, 2005b). The immediate contributing causal factor in over half of the events was system 
start-up or shut down.  Most releases were air releases (88%), and about a third of the events 
involved the release of mixtures of chemicals.   
About a quarter of the events were caused when complex industrial processes were shut 
down in preparation for the hurricanes. The shutdowns that occurred while preparing for 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita were more massive and involved numerous simultaneous 
activities and rapidly changing process conditions compared with one process or unit 
during normal shutdowns. Additionally, these large massive shutdowns had not been done 
before.  
There is a need for different shutdown procedures that involve massive shutdowns of entire 
plants, such as those that occur during hurricanes.  One lesson learned from Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita is that it is critical for chemical facilities to better coordinate with state and 
local emergency preparedness agencies, especially for decisions concerning mandatory 
evacuation orders which can directly impact plant shutdown sequence and timing 
(Challener, 2006). The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency advises that all industry 
sectors review past events associated with shutdowns during hazardous weather conditions 
and make administrative/procedural, operational/process equipment and 
hardware/software safety improvements as needed (U. S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, 2010).  Chemical facilities should also establish staff responsibilities and procedures 
to shut down process operations safely (U. S. Department of Energy, 2008). 
Almost a quarter of the events were caused when major industrial processes started up after 
the hurricanes. The start-ups that occurred following the massive shutdowns in preparation 
for the hurricanes were also large-scale. Many plants used this opportunity to conduct 
massive maintenance or repairs on the idled plants, as equipment in some facilities in Texas 
dates back to the 1940s. The maintenance resulted in releases. Additionally, releases are 
more likely to occur when processes are shut down for more than one day (U.S. Chemical 
Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, 2005.)  
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The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board issued a safety bulletin for 
precautions needed during oil and chemical facility start-up following hurricanes. The 
Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board recommends that as facilities resume 
operations, established and up-to-date start-up procedures and checklists should be 
followed and pre-start-up safety reviews should be carefully performed. Specific 
recommendations include using appropriate management-of-change processes before 
making any modifications; having adequate staffing and expertise available before starting 
up; and evacuating nonessential personnel from nearby process units that are starting up.   
The Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board also recommends that equipment, 
tanks, and instrumentation be thoroughly evaluated for damage. Particular attention should 
be given to examining large bulk storage tanks and pressure vessels for evidence of floating 
displacement or damage, and examining sewers, drains, furnace systems, electric motors 
and drives, switchgear, conduits, electrical boxes, electronic and pneumatic instrumentation, 
emergency warning systems, emergency equipment, and insulation systems for piping, 
vessels, and tanks for trapped floodwater and debris-impact damage (U.S. Chemical Safety 
and Hazard Investigation Board, 2005.) 
Industrial releases resulting from power failures may benefit from improved backup  
power generation (Ruckart et al., 2004). Generators and backup lights should be tested  
in preparation for a hurricane, extra fuel should be on-hand, and generators should be 
located in areas of the facility that are not likely to be flooded (U. S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, 2006). Other efforts include filling all storage tanks to prevent floating or 
falling during hurricane-force winds, adequately securing equipment and piping to 
withstand high winds, and properly labeling all chemical bulk storage tanks to aid 
identification if these items are washed or wind-blown away (U. S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, 2006). 
5.4 Carbon monoxide incidents 
Carbon monoxide was the most frequently released single hazardous substance. Carbon 
monoxide poisoning, particularly from misuse of generators in residences, was the largest 
source of the morbidity and mortality; over two-thirds of the 160 victims were injured in 
carbon monoxide–related events. In another study of 27 incidents of carbon monoxide 
poisoning that resulted in 10 fatal and 78 nonfatal cases in Alabama and Texas after 
Hurricane Katrina and Rita, the majority of incidents were caused by portable generators.  
Most of the generators were placed outside but close to the home in order to power window 
air conditioners or to connect to central electric panels.   
Interviews of 18 of the 27 incident households showed that only 6 (33%) had a carbon 
monoxide detector present, but only one alarm went off.  The other 4 had dead batteries and 
one sent a signal to a remote security system that was unable to alert the household by 
telephone.  The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention recommends that because there 
has shown to be no safe distance for generator placement, there should be functional carbon 
monoxide detectors in all households (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2006b).  
Our data show that responders were injured by carbon monoxide while sleeping in 
temporary housing (camper). Therefore this recommendation should be expanded to 
temporary housing as well.   
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In January 2007, the Consumer Product Safety Commission required manufacturers to place 
a danger label on all new generators and the generator packaging. The commission began to 
explore various strategies to reduce consumers’ exposure to carbon monoxide including 
generator engines with substantially reduced carbon monoxide emissions, and interlocking 
or automatic shutoff devices (Consumer Product Safety Commission, 2009). These measures 
could potentially reduce harm in the future. 
5.5 Case studies 
Lessons learned in case study 1 are the importance in the haste of preparing for an 
oncoming hurricane or responding after one occurs of adhering to important health and 
safety measures. Almost 25% of the 2005 hurricane victims reported to HSEES were injured 
in a single bus accident when oxygen tanks exploded on a bus carrying senior citizens who 
were being evacuated prior to Hurricane Rita. They were placed on a bus that had 
numerous safety violations in the haste of trying to secure a bus when their dedicated bus 
was not available.  Hospital and nursing home administrators face several challenges during 
hurricanes, including deciding whether to evacuate or shelter inside their facilities until the 
outside danger is over.   
According to a the National Transportation Safety Bord, the charter bus fire incident showed 
how ill prepared the United States was to evacuate those who are most vulnerable, 
particularly the elderly, disabled, and those in hospitals and nursing homes. The loss of life 
was exacerbated by the frailty of the passengers. This incident highlights the need for special 
plans to be developed for nursing home residents (as well as other institutionalized 
residents, such as hospitalized persons or prisoners) because they are not able to quickly 
escape from hazardous substance events and have special considerations.  
Motor coaches were used for this evacuation and will be used again should a similar 
emergency arise.  Following this incident, the National Transportation Safety Board issued 
several recommendations to other agencies to protect the travelling public that should be 
urgently implemented (National Transportation Safety Board, 2007). The U.S. National 
Transportation Safety Board also investigated the risk that medical oxygen tanks posed to 
rescuers during the fire. Three days after the accident, the Department of Transportation 
issued “Guidance for the Safe Transportation of Medical Oxygen for Personal Use on Buses 
and Trains” which recommends that medical oxygen be securely stored upright and be  
limited to one canister per patient in the passenger compartment (U.S. Department of 
Transportation, 2006). 
There are several lessons learned from case study 2, when an oil spill contaminated a large 
residential area. One lesson is the need for improved and more rapid identification of 
environmental hazards and their communication to emergency responders and the public.  
Another lesson learned is the need during a hurricane and aftermath for greater 
collaboration among Federal, State, and local officials, as well as an enhanced public 
communication program. All of these measures could have improved the effectiveness of 
the Federal response (Manuel, 2006; The White House, 2006) 
Case Study 3 highlights that in the haste of rebuilding, proper health and safety measures 
for handling the hurricane hazardous substance contaminated debris were not followed. 
The “hub and spoke” method of debris handling is supported by the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency and the Army Corps of Engineers. It involves collecting debris on the 
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curbside and taking it to temporary staging sites in more central locations in the day time, 
followed by night-time hauling to permitted landfills outside the city (Citizens for a Strong 
New Orleans East, 2006). This would have avoided the use of the unpermitted landfill that 
was not designed properly to handle hazardous waste. 
6. Conclusion 
Because preventing hurricanes is not possible, increased attention must be focused on 
preventing and minimizing acute releases of hazardous substances during hurricanes and 
preplanning in case releases do occur. Because of the urgency of a hurricane, preplanning 
for those most vulnerable and increased diligence to health and safety during and after a 
hurricane are called for.   
Many of the incidents occurred due to power interruption. Industries, particularly in 
hurricane prone areas, can take steps to minimize their risks for chemical releases in future 
power outages. Additionally, public health campaigns that emphasize placement of 
generators as far away from the home as possible should continue. Since no safe distance 
has been determined, the use of battery operated, functional carbon monoxide detectors 
should be stressed for all sleeping quarters, temporary or permanent.  
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